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Income-related housing allowances are used by most advanced welfare 
states to ensure their citizens have access to decent accommodation at a 
price within their means. Surprisingly, whether the subsidy should be paid 
to the claimant or direct to the landlord has attracted little attention, 
despite differences existing between countries.  
This paper uses data collected as part of the evaluation of the Direct 
Payment Demonstration Projects (DPDPs) in Great Britain to test the 
impact on rent collection and arrears of paying Housing Benefit to 
tenants, as oppose to the landlord direct. The DPDPs aimed to provide 
learning in readiness for the introduction of Universal Credit, which sees 
six separate benefits consolidated into one monthly payment made to the 
claimant. 
Using quasi-experimental rent account analysis techniques direct 
payment was found to have a significant negative effect on both rent 
collection and arrears, with the proportion of rent collected reduced by 5.5 
percentage points. However evidence suggested the longer term impact 
may be smaller as tenants become more 'responsiblised'.These findings 
make an important contribution to the major theoretical debate on the 
effectiveness of using welfare policy to promote 'responsibilisation,' which 
has become the dominant discourse since the mid-late 1990's.  
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Income-related housing allowances are used by most advanced welfare 
states to ensure their citizens have access to decent accommodation at a price 
within their means. The precise instruments used vary between countries and 
over time (see Kemp, 2007 for a review). There is an established academic 
literature on housing allowances that has assessed and compared regimes. 
However surprisingly, the effects of paying the subsidy to the claimant, rather 
than the landlord direct, has attracted little attention. 
In the United Kingdom (UK) for over 30 years payment of housing 
allowance for tenants in the social housing sector (Housing Benefit) has been 
made direct to the landlord as the norm. This is in contrast to many developed 
countries such as the United States, Germany, France and the Netherlands 
(Kemp, 2007).  However the introduction of Universal Credit, as part of a wider 
government welfare reform agenda which seeks to encourage 
responsibilisation, sees a major change in how Housing Benefit is administered, 
following earlier changes in the private rented sector. Under Universal Credit in 
the majority of cases the housing allowance is paid monthly, within a total 
Universal Credit payment, direct to the tenant. Tenants then have responsibility 
for paying their own rent to their landlord. 
This paper considers the impact on rent collection and arrears of giving 
tenants the responsibility for paying their Housing Benefit to their landlord. In 
2012 the then Coalition Government established Direct Payment Demonstration 
Projects (DPDPs) in six local authorities to test the direct payment of Housing 
Benefit to social housing tenants. The Demonstration Projects were to provide 
lessons for the design and implementation of Universal Credit. They also 
provide a unique natural experiment through which to test the impact of direct 
payment on rent collection and arrears. In this case study there has been a 
change in the payment method of Housing Benefit for a limited number of 
tenants, thus allowing Differences-in-Differences analysis of rent collection and 
arrears data against a quasi-experimental matched comparator: tenants not 
considered for participation on the trial and who remained on the incumbent 
landlord payment method. Underpinning this analysis is tenant level rent 
account and Housing Benefit administrative data collected as part of the 
evaluation of the DPDPs. 
The findings fill two important gaps in the literature that are of relevance 
both within the UK but also elsewhere. First, they quantify the impact on rent 
collection and arrears of giving tenants responsibility for paying their housing 
allowance to their landlord. To the author’s knowledge this has not previously 
been addressed in the literature on housing allowances.  Indeed, there has not 
been a similar change in payment method in other countries to allow a similar 
scientific analysis of the impact of direct payment of Housing Benefit on rent 
collection and analysis. Second, the paper contributes to the evidence base on 
welfare policy and responibilisation, in particular whether tenants adapt to new 
benefit payment structures and manage paying their rent on a monthly basis. 
Following this introduction the paper introduces Housing Benefit and 
explains Universal Credit and the direct payment of Housing Benefit. The paper 
then considers the theoretical impact of direct payment on rent collection - 
including specifying the hypothesis and themes to be explored - and provides a 
review of the limited evidence base. Sections six, seven and eight introduce the 
DPDPs, provide a description of the methods used and the subsequent results. 
A discussion and a conclusion then follow. 
 
Housing Benefit 
Housing Benefit is an income-related housing allowance introduced in 
the UK through the Social Security and Housing Benefit Act (1982). It provides 
means tested benefit paid to social and private tenants on a low income to help 
them pay their rent. Until recently, for tenants in the social housing sector, it has 
typically been paid direct to the landlord on the tenant's behalf. 
Unlike many other countries which operate 'housing gap' schemes 
(Howestine, 1986) Housing Benefit has an income support function. Recipients 
receive an amount which means they have an income that is no less than the 
social assistance benefit rate after eligible rent is deducted (Hills, 1991; Kemp, 
2007). Some claimants receive 'full Housing Benefit' - equal to 100 per cent of 
their eligible rent - if they are in receipt of a passported benefit (being in receipt 
of the following benefits entitles the recipient to full Housing Benefit: Income 
Support, Hobseekers Allowance (income based) Employment and Supportt 
Allowance (income-related) and Pension Credit (guarantee credit)) or have an 
income not in excess of the social assistance benefit rate. If a claimant has an 
income of more than the social assistance rate they are entitled to 'partial 
Housing Benefit': a payment equal to their eligible rent minus 65 per cent of the 
difference between their net rent and the social assistance benefit rates.   
A succession of problems have been highlighted in the design and 
administration of Housing Benefit in Britain, mirroring the experience in other 
countries (Kemp, 2007). These include: paying the benefit direct to the landlord 
removed the link between rent payment and the tenant, meaning housing 
appeared as a free good; the high taper provided strong work disincentives 
(Gibb, 1995); the system covered 100 per cent of rent (albeit subject to 
restrictions) thus creating a moral hazard, reducing any incentive for claimants 
to seek better or more appropriate housing (Kemp, 1998; Kemp, 2000) and 
encouraging overconsumption (Hills, 1991; Gibb 1995); the system contained 
relatively high horizontal inefficiencies, in that it was not restricted to those most 
in need; and the costs of the system had risen dramatically, and because 
entitlement was demand led there was a fear of uncontrollability (Haffner and 
Boelhouwer, 2006; Priemus et al., 2005).  
 
Universal Credit and the direct payment of Housing Benefit  
In July 2010, the newly elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government in the UK published 21st Century Welfare (DWP, 2010a), a 
consultation document on the reform of the benefits system. The analysis 
concluded that the existing system was too complex and presented 
disincentives to move into work which resulted in rising costs of welfare support 
and persistent welfare dependency (Ferrari, 2015). The principles and 
proposals set out in the consultation paper were detailed further in the White 
Paper, Universal Credit: Welfare that Works (DWP, 2010b), and enshrined in 
law when the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (DWP, 2012) received royal assent in 
March 2012. 
The flagship feature of this Act was the introduction of Universal Credit 
which led to major changes in the mix of benefits and Tax Credits people could 
receive, the support offered as well as the conditions and work-related 
expectations placed on claimants. It provided a single system of means-tested 
support, with the merger of six existing benefits - including Housing Benefit - for 
working age people, who were in or out of work, into a single monthly benefit 
payment paid to the claimant. This represented a major change for claimants in 
the social housing sector, particularly those on full Housing Benefit, as they are 
given the responsibility for paying their own rent to their landlord - some of 
whom would never have previously experienced this expectation. 
A number of safeguards were put in place to support tenants, including 
Alternative Payment Arrangements (APAs) for claimants who genuinely couldn’t 
manage their monthly housing cost payment. APAs include having a managed 
payment to the landlord, a split payment or a more frequent payment. The need 
for an APA may be identified at the onset by a Jobcentre Plus work coach 
during a Work Search Interview, alongside Personal Budgeting Support or 
during the claim. APAs can also be triggered by the claimant, their 
representative, or the landlord advising of a build-up of rent arrears. 
The introduction of Universal Credit represents a continuation of the new 
welfare state model 'responsibilisation agenda' (Peeters, 2013) which looks to 
'enable' (Gilbert, 2002) and 'prepare' individuals to prevent and deal with social 
harms (Peeters, 2013). Responsibilisation developed out of governmentality 
studies and refers to the 'process whereby subjects are rendered individually 
responsible for a task which previously would have been the duty of another – 
usually a state agency – or would not have been recognized as a responsibility 
at all' (O'Malley, 2009, p 276). The subject is then called on to take an active 
role in resolving and protecting themselves from their own social problems 
(Shore and Wright 2011). 
Strategies for rendering social housing tenants as 'responsible subjects' 
are not new (Flint 2004). However, giving tenants' responsibility for paying their 
rent has been seen as important in breaking the dependent relationship 
between the individual and the state, and to prevent housing appearing like a 
free good. In turn this would provide positive externalities. For example it would 
create aspirational tenants keen to better themselves (Raco, 2009); tenants 
would become more effective money managers; and it would incentivise and 
smooth the transition into paid work (Keohane and Shorthouse, 2012; IPPR, 
2010). 
This paper assesses the impact of direct payment on landlords in terms 
of reduced rent collection and arrears. The next section considers the 
theoretical impact, and specifies the hypothesis and themes that are tested 
later.   
 
Impact of direct payment of Housing Benefit on rent payment: theory 
The previous section explains that the move to the direct payment of 
Housing Benefit to tenants is part of wider welfare reform to promote 
responsibiliation of social housing tenants. This paper considers just one aspect 
of responsibilisation: whether tenants pay their rent as expected using landlord 
rent collection rates. In this context a self-managing tenant understands that 
they are entangled in widespread ties, dependencies and duties to others 
(Trnka and Trundle, 2014) and is able to enact their responsibility to pay their 
rent to their landlord. Other authors have used the same evidence base to 
consider the wider impacts and experiences of direct payment on tenants and 
landlord (Hickman et al, 2017; DWP, 2014a). 
In a basic theoretical model of rent collection provided below (1) the 
expected amount of rent collected by a landlord (E(r)) is a proportion (P) of the 
total amount of rent due (r). Where P, the proportion of rent collected, is itself a 
function of factors including payment method, age, household type, economic 
status, income, Housing Benefit receipt and whether Housing Benefit is paid to 
the tenant or landlord direct.  
(1)  𝐸(𝑟) = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1   
The success of tenants in taking responsibility for paying their rent can 
be quantified by assessing the impact of direct payment, compared to landlord 
payment, on the proportion of rent paid: P in equation 1. This paper tests and 
quantifies the hypothesis that giving tenants the responsibility for paying their 
Housing Benefit to their landlord has a negative impact on rent collection and 
arrears. This is because not all tenants will be able to successfully take control 
for paying their rent on time. Thus, all things being equal, additional payment 
risk is added into equation 1, reducing the value of P. 
Sharon Wright's (2016) two contrasting constructions of the active 
welfare subject are useful to explain why tenants may not be able to 
successfully take responsibility for paying their rent. Some tenants will not have 
sufficient financial capability to become responsible for their rent payment. 
Wright terms this the dominant model where recipients are viewed as inherently 
deficient. The World Bank (2013, p7) defines financial capability as ‘the internal 
capacity to act in one’s best financial interest given socioeconomic 
environmental conditions. It therefore encompasses the knowledge, attitudes, 
skills and behaviours of consumers with regard to managing their resources and 
understanding, selecting and making use of financial services that fit their 
needs’. The literature on financial capability reveals that, as one might expect, 
some population groups are less capable. These include young adults, 
particularly those aged 18 to 24 years (Money Advice Service, 2015) as well as 
'recipients of benefits being replaced by … [Universal Credit]..., in particular 
unemployed people' (Money Advice Service, 2015, p5).   
Alternatively, under Wright's second construct, tenants may be 
responsible subjects, however, economic and power structures (Lister 2004, 
174) may mean that other factors hinder their ability to successfully pay their 
rent. For instance they have insufficient money in their account to honour 
payments or there are administrative issues due to payments not being set up 
properly.  
Quantifying the average reduction in collection rates and arrears alone 
provides a blunt, high-level, assessment of the impact of Direct Payment. A 
more nuanced analysis is therefore also undertaken in this paper that views a 
tenant's transfer to direct payment as a process. This analysis is informed by 
Normalisation Process Theory (NPT), a middle range theory derived from 
empirical analysis of health care settings. NPT provides useful framework to 
understand and evaluate the embedding of material practices in social contexts. 
It proposes (Elwyn et al., 2008 May and Finch, 2009): 1) practices become 
routinely embedded – or normalized – in social contexts as the result of people 
working, individually and collectively, to enact them. 2) The work of enacting a 
practice is promoted or inhibited through the operation of generative 
mechanisms (coherence, cognitive participation, collective action, reflexive 
monitoring) through which human agency is expressed. 3) The production and 
reproduction of a practice requires continuous investment by agents in 
ensembles of action that is carried forward in time and space. 
NPT gives way to three further themes to consider  in the discussion 
section. First is whether the impact consistent over time? Proposition three of 
NPT suggests that the successful reproduction of tenants having responsibility 
for paying rent requires continuous investment by agents in ensembles of action 
that are carried forward in time and space. Therefore improved rent payment 
actions will occur as greater exposure to direct payment promotes, and 
embeds, more positive disposal (interactional workability), confidence (relational 
integration), performance (skill-set workability) and realization (contextual 
integration). 
The second theme of discussion is to what extent is the negative impact 
due to tenants who switch back within the first few periods on direct payment? 
Proposition two of NPT proposes that successful normalisation of a practice 
requires the necessary skills, attributes and mechanisms - what NPT terms skill-
set workabilities - to improve performance. Without proper assessment and 
support there can be limited contextual integration, meaning some tenants 
transferred onto direct payment without the necessary skills to execute and 
realise the practice of paying their rent successfully. As a result, it is highly likely 
that some tenants were transferred onto direct payment that under more 
developed criteria would have been safeguarded and/or supported. Many of 
these tenants are likely to have quickly accrued arrears and switched back. 
The final theme of discussion is whether tenant's payments follow 
patterns? This reflects NPT's construct of the need to invest in reflective 
monitoring and evaluation of payment patterns to understand how tenants 
produced and reproduced the new process of paying their rent following direct 
payment of Housing Benefit. Learning from monitoring and evaluation can be 
used to identify issues in the normalisation of tenants to successful pay their 
rent and inform interventions for improved practice. 
The next section considers the limited evidence base on direct payment 
of Housing Benefit. 
 
Impact of direct payment of Housing Benefit on rent payment: 
evidence 
The international literature on housing allowances has tended to focus on 
issues such as the efficacy of the Housing Benefit system as a whole (Kemp, 
1998; King, 1999; Kemp, 2000; Kemp et al., 2002; Stephens, 2005); comparing 
systems (Kemp, 2000; Priemus and Kemp, 2004); the impact of changes to the 
system (Gibbons and Manning, 2006; Fenton, 2011); and its cost (Phillips, 
2013; Johnson, 2015; Wilcox and Perry, 2014). Despite differences between 
countries little attention has been given in the literature to the effects of paying 
housing allowances to tenants (direct payment) or to landlords (landlord 
payment).  
However four publications relevant to the UK experience do explore the 
issue of direct payment of Housing Benefit to tenants. In 2002 London and 
Quadrant Housing Trust (LQHT) undertook a one year trial of direct payment 
involving 800 tenants. The findings indicated that rent arrears more than  
doubled from three per cent to seven per cent over the course of the trial, 
peaking at nine per cent (Donaldson, 2004). This pilot also identified additional 
transactional costs associated with direct payment, with further costs accruing 
as a result of 'additional staff time pursuing individual residents for their arrears' 
(Donaldson, 2004, p21). 
Green et al. (2015) undertook an online survey of social housing 
landlords' readiness for the introduction of Universal Credit, including direct 
payment of Housing Benefit. They found that landlords believed the Universal 
Credit would result in an increase in arrears (98 per cent thought that this would 
be the case); a change in relationships between landlord and tenant (96 per 
cent); more resources being devoted to rent collection and rent recovery (95 per 
cent); and more staff being employed (75 per cent). 
Power et al. (2014) explored the likely impact of welfare reform on the 
poorest residents in the most deprived areas in the country. This study included 
surveys and focus groups with housing associations and tenants. They reported 
that welfare reform, including direct payment through Universal Credit, is likely 
to create greater interdependency between landlords and tenants. At the time of 
the research, tenant awareness of Universal Credit was low. However, when 
explained, two thirds thought that a direct monthly payment of Housing Benefit 
to the tenant was a bad idea. More than half of tenants surveyed said they 
would find the monthly payment difficult to manage. They foresaw a number of 
issues: worries about unexpected calls on funds and the temptation to cover 
more immediate costs than rent; arrears caused by adjustment onto the new 
system; difficulties in setting up Direct Debits or alternative payment methods; 
and increased levels of stress and anxiety resulting from the new system being 
too complicated. Most tenants thought direct payment of Housing Benefit would 
create difficulties for landlords and would increase homelessness. The research 
also identified how social landlords were changing their approach in readiness 
for the roll out of Universal Credit by promoting bank accounts and credit 
unions, helping tenants to open accounts, developing money management 
skills, strengthening recovery teams and assisting tenants to build up credit on 
their rent accounts. 
In the final study Irvine et al. (2007) conducted a detailed qualitative 
study of 82 Housing Benefit claimants renting from private and social housing 
landlords in three local authority areas in England. The aim was to examine 
claimants’ understanding, attitude and experiences of the two different systems 
of paying Housing Benefit: to the tenant or to the landlord.  Of tenants 
interviewed 58 were on landlord payment and 24 on tenant payment. The 
research team found that, while most of the participants had a preference for 
landlord payment, many did not think it would be particularly difficult to adjust to 
tenant payment (Irvine et al. 2007, p10). Most tenants also stated that they 
prioritised paying their rent over other household bills.  
This study also identified two types of tenants whose approach to money 
management suggested they were more likely, or who said they were more 
likely, to get into rent arrears if they were on direct payment. The first group 
were 'chaotic' money managers, who were 'found only among young people 
and lone parents and had difficult financial situations and many of them said 
they could be forgetful about paying bills and/or were generally careless with 
money' (Irvine et al 2007, p2). The second group were 'flexible' money 
managers. This group were identified as being 'less rigid than ‘ordered’ money 
managers (who 'preferred payment methods that they felt provided control over 
when and how much they paid, such as cash, cheques, and internet banking') 
(Irvine et al, 2007, p2). 
The next section introduces the DPDPs. 
 
The Direct Payment Demonstration Projects 
In advance of the roll out of Universal Credit, the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) created six DPDPs to test the direct payment of Housing 
Benefit for social housing tenants, with the findings to inform Universal Credit 
development. The six DPDPs - which involved 12 social housing landlords - 
were Oxford, Shropshire, Southwark, Wakefield (all in England), Torfaen 
(Wales) and Edinburgh (Scotland). These areas were selected by the DWP 
because they varied in terms of participating landlord types and different 
geographies covered.  
The Demonstration Projects went live over the summer of 2012, with the 
first direct payments being made in June 2012. In line with Universal Credit, 
only working age claimants were eligible for direct payment, with the plan for 
2,000 tenants to be included in each Demonstration Project. Tenants were 
moved onto the programme in a phased approach. This reflected complexities 
in engaging tenants in the programme and the preparedness of tenants to move 
onto direct payment. The programme concluded in December 2013, by which 
time 7,426 tenants had received a direct payment.  
Tenants on the DPDP programme experienced two main changes in how 
their Housing Benefit was administered. Direct payment tenants received their 
Housing Benefit payment every four weeks (broadly in-line with monthly 
payments under Universal Credit), as opposed to weekly or fortnightly as per 
their previous arrangements. They were then responsible for paying their full 
rent to their landlord. Tenants encountering difficulties with direct payment and 
who fell into arrears were switched back to landlord payment. This replicated 
the APA system available in the Universal Credit environment.   
Before testing the hypothesis set out earlier the next section describes 




A bespoke longitudinal dataset collated as part of the DWP funded 
evaluation of the DPDPs forms the evidence base for this paper. The 12 DPDP 
landlords provided individual tenant level data for tenants who received a direct 
payment of Housing Benefit between June 2012 and December 2013. The 
range of data collated included: project monitoring data, such as whether a 
tenant had reached a trigger point (an agreed level of additional rent arrears) 
and who had been switched back; detailed rent account information on charges 
and payments; administrative Housing Benefit data collected for the Single 
Housing Benefit Extract (SHBE), a monthly electronic scan of Housing Benefit 
claimant level data direct from local authority computer systems; and other 
landlord held data on the characteristics and circumstances of tenants for 
example age, household composition, work status and tenancy status.  
The direct payment sample included tenants for whom the projects 
provided both rent account and Housing Benefit data in at least one rent 
account period, and for whom there was some activity on their rent account. 
Tenants with no experience of direct payment were not included in the analysis. 
Data were provided for 7,252 tenants who had been paid their Housing Benefit 
direct, which represented 98 per cent of the total number recorded by DWP 
going onto the programme.  
To assess the net additional impact of direct payment with a high level of 
scientific rigor (Farrington et al., 2002) equivalent data were also collated for a 
comparator sample of social housing tenants who were on Housing Benefit, but 
who were not considered for inclusion in the Demonstration Projects. In total, 
data for 9,111 tenants were provided from the wider tenant bases of five social 
landlords. This comprised four Demonstration Project landlords (Oxford City 
Council, Southwark Council, Bron Afon in Torfaen and Wakefield and District 
Housing) as well as Port of Leith, which was not part of the Demonstration 
Project, but which provided data on their tenants to form a comparator for the 
Edinburgh project (Dunedin Canmore). It was not possible to obtain comparator 
data from Shropshire. A comparator sample for that Demonstration Project was 
therefore derived from samples provided by other Demonstration Projects. 
Propensity score matching was used to derive the final comparator 
sample for the analysis. All DPDP tenants were matched to their nearest 
neighbour within the comparator sample based on 12 attributes. The 4,941 
comparator tenants who were a nearest neighbour went into the final 
comparator sample. Weights were applied if a comparator tenant was a nearest 
neighbour to more than one DPDP tenant. The resultant comparator sample 
population was found to be very similar over a range of key socio-demographic 
characteristics, including baseline rent account position, full or partial Housing 
Benefit receipt, household composition and employment status. 
There are a number of strengths to the evidence base, including it 
contained: nearly all tenants who went onto direct payment; a wide and detailed 
range of administrative rent account and Housing Benefit level data, which are 
assumed to be more accurate than self-reported responses; data covering time 
periods before and after tenants went onto direct payment; equivalent data for a 
quasi-experimental matched comparator sample of tenants, none of whom 
received a direct payment. The evidence base allowed a robust assessment of 
the impact with a high level of scientific rigor, achieving level 4 on the Maryland 
Scale of Scientific Methods (Farrington et at, 2002). 
However, it is important to acknowledge limitations which affect the 
generalisability and robustness of the findings. In particular the landlords and 
tenants taking part in the DPDP were not randomly selected and are drawn 
from just six areas of the UK. The areas were chosen because they covered 
different landlord types and tenants were 'typical' of the participating landlords’ 
wider tenant base (i.e. not their most or least 'able' tenants). It is therefore not 
the case that the DPDP areas, their landlords or the tenants are proportionally 
representative of their respective populations in the UK. This means there are 
likely to be biases which affect the representativeness of the sample to the 
overall population who are eligible for Universal Credit. Therefore the broad 
conclusion and lessons developed in this paper are able to inform the likely 
impact of direct payment of Housing benefit within Universal Credit. However, 
the precise quantitative impact will be affected by these biases as well as the 
wider, changing, housing and welfare policy environment. It is also likely that 
the relatively low number of tenants participating in the Demonstration Project 
within each landlord's tenant base enabled landlords to apply more resources to 
preventative and reactive debt management than would be possible if Universal 
Credit had been fully rolled out.     
It should also be pointed out that this analysis is not an assessment of 
the impact of Universal Credit, only the direct payment of Housing Benefit to 
tenants. There are features of the full introduction of Universal Credit which may 
limit the impact of direct payment on rent collection/arrears. For example, the 
larger benefit payment may mean tenants are less likely to suffer from failed 
Direct Debits due to insufficient funds. Similarly other features may increase the 
impact on rent payment, such as the need to balance a greater proportion of 
their household income over a longer - monthly - timeframe.  
 
Outcome measures 
Having outlined the evidence base the following sets out the key 
outcome measures that have been used to address the research question set 
out in the introduction. In common with how social housing landlords assess 
rent payment, this paper focuses on two outcome measures: rent arrears and 
rent collection rates. Rent arrears have been calculated by comparing the 
amount that a tenant's rent account balance in is debit (arrears) against their 
annualised rent, to give a percentage. So for example if a tenant was £500 in 
deficit and their annualised rent was £18,000 then their rent arrears rate would 
be 2.8 per cent. A rent arrears rate can be calculated across a wider tenant 
base by expressing the sum of debits as a percentage of the summed annual 
rent roll.  
Rent collection rates have been calculated by assessing the proportion of 
rent paid over a given period. In order to standardise this measurement over 
time and to allow temporal analysis ‘rent payment periods’ were created. These 
refer to four-week periods, or a month in the case of Edinburgh, over which 
landlords would expect tenant rent accounts to balance, if a tenant was up to 
date with their rent. Payment period 1 therefore refers to the rent cycle (i.e. the 
period for which rent is due) following a first direct payment of Housing Benefit, 
regardless of the calendar month in which that payment was made. Payment 
period 2 refers to the rent cycle following the second direct payment of Housing 
Benefit and so on. A rent collection rate can then be calculated for each rent 
payment period, or over a combination of rent payment periods. In this context: 
 a rent collection rate of one implies the value of rent collected equated the 
amount of rent due. So if a tenant owed £100 worth of additional rent in a 
period s/he had paid £100 
 a rent collection rate greater than one implies a tenant paid more than the 
additional rent owed; for example a rent collection rate of 1.2 suggests a 
tenant paid £1.20 for every £1 of additional rent owed 
 a rent collection rate less than one implies a tenant did not pay all of 
his/her rent owed; for example a rent collection rate of 0.8 suggests a 
tenant paid £0.80 for every £1 of additional rent owed. 
 
Results and analysis 
This section tests the hypothesis that direct payment of housing benefit 
will have a negative effect on rent payment: reduced rent collection and 
increased arrears. It begins with a descriptive assessment of the main outcome 
variables before using statistical modelling techniques to quantify the net 
additional impact of direct payment of Housing Benefit to tenants. 
Just over £33,072,000 in rent was charged to DPDP tenants in rent 
periods when they received their Housing Benefit paid direct. In return 
£31,331,000 was collected from the same tenants giving a rent collection rate of 
94.7 per cent. The collection rate for tenants in the comparator sample, none of 
whom received direct payment, was 99.1 per cent of their rent due. Therefore 
tenants who were paid their Housing Benefit direct collectively paid on average 
4.4 percentage points less of their rent due over the Demonstration Project. 
Based on the rent due from direct payment tenants this equates to £1,448,000 
less rent collected.  
Considering rent arrears rates reveals a similar picture. The collective 
rent arrears rate for tenants at the point when they started receiving direct 
payment of Housing Benefit was 2.3 per cent. This increased to 5.7 per cent, an 
increase of just under 150 per cent over the rent account periods when tenants 
received direct payment. Rent arrears rates also increased for tenants in the 
comparator sample. However, this increase was considerable lower: 50 per 
cent from 2.4 per cent to 3.5 per cent.  If the rent arrears rate for direct payment 
tenants had only increased by this level just under £1,132,000 less arrears 
would have been accumulated onto tenants' rent accounts. 
The second stage of analysis used Generalised Estimating Equations 
(GEEs) to estimate the net additional impact of direct payment over time. This 
used longitudinal rent period data covering periods when DPDP tenants were, 
and were not, on direct payment and compared rent collection rates against 
comparator tenants who never experienced direct payment. Within these 
models there were dummies to control for Housing Benefit destination (whether 
it was paid to the tenant or the landlord), whether the tenant was subject to 
Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy, whether the tenant was subject to the 
Benefit Cap, and whether the tenant had been switched back onto landlord 
payment. The results (Table 1) reveal statistical evidence, at a 0.05 level, of an 
net additional effect of receiving rent by direct payment on rent collection rates 
in a given rent payment period. On average 5.5 percentage points less rent per 
rent payment period was collected from tenants who were paid their rent direct: 
equating to £5.50 less rent per £100 of rent charged. 
 
  
Table 1: The net additional impact of direct payment using GEE 
 Outcome: Rent 
collection rate Coef. S.E. P. 
Direct Payment -0.055 0.001 0.000 
RSRS 14% -0.012 0.003 0.000 
RSRS 25% -0.021 0.005 0.000 
Benefit Cap 0.007 0.011 0.506 
Switched back 0.039 0.003 0.000 
Constant 1.014 0.001 0.000 
Source: DPDP rent account analysis dataset (2012-2013) 
 
Discussion  
The empirical evidence presented above points to direct payment having 
a negative net additional impact on rent collection and arrears. This has 
important implications for landlord finances and the underlying principles of 
direct payment that tenants are able to successfully take responsibility for 
paying their rent. It also brings into question why Universal Credit should 
contain a housing element. However this reductionist view needs to be set 
against more nuanced analysis that views a tenant's transfer to direct payment 
as a process. This analysis has been informed by NPT and explores three 
themes: 'is the impact consistent over time?'; 'to what extent is the negative 
impact due to tenants who switch back within the first few periods on direct 
payment?'; and 'do tenant's payments follow patterns?' 
 
Is the impact consistent over time? 
This  theme of analysis seeks to understand whether tenants increase 
their financial capability over time, which in turn translates to a smaller impact of 
direct payment on P (equation 1). Table 2 shows a marked improvement in rent 
collection rates after the first few direct payments of Housing Benefit). In the first 
three rent payment periods (a period of approximately 12 weeks) after 
transferring onto direct payment, tenants paid on average 15.7 percentage 
points less rent per payment period than the quasi-experimental comparator 
group who had their Housing Benefit paid direct to their landlord. In payment 
periods 4-6 the impact reduced to 2.8 percentage points less rent. The net 
additional impact was lower still in payment periods 7-9: 1.3 percentage points 
less rent collected. In the remaining three 12 week periods the impact ranged 
between 2.1 and 3.5 percentage points less rent collected per payment period.  
This suggests that the long run impact of direct payment will be less than 
the 5.5 percentage points identified in the results section. Potentially it may be 
as low as 2 percentage points less rent collected per rent period. The reduction 
in the negative impact of direct payment over time is likely to have resulted from 
tenants quickly adapting to the new system and the effects of the switchback 
mechanism removing tenants who were unable to adjust.  
 
Table 2: The net additional impact of direct payment over time using GEE 
 Outcome: Rent 
collection rate Coef. S.E. P. 
Direct Payment P1-P3 -0.157 0.003 0.000 
Direct Payment P4-P6 -0.028 0.003 0.000 
Direct Payment P7-P9 -0.013 0.003 0.000 
Direct Payment P10-P12 -0.024 0.003 0.000 
Direct Payment P13-P15 -0.035 0.003 0.000 
Direct Payment P16-P18 -0.022 0.004 0.000 
RSRS 14% -0.021 0.003 0.000 
RSRS 25% -0.030 0.005 0.000 
Benefit Cap 0.006 0.011 0.571 
Switched back 0.041 0.003 0.000 
Constant 1.015 0.001 0.000 
Source: DPDP rent account analysis dataset (2012-2013) 
 
To what extent is the negative impact due to tenants who switch 
back within the first few periods on direct payment? 
Reflecting Universal Credit thinking at that time, the initial support 
assessment process used by the Demonstration Projects to identify tenants' 
readiness for direct payment was only designed to safeguard a small proportion 
of tenants with the most complex needs. The following analysis removes those 
tenants who switched back in their first three payment periods as a proxy for 
those who should not have gone onto direct payment. Repeating the GEE 
models with this sub group of direct payment tenants reveals that on average, 
tenants paid 5.0 percentage points less rent per payment period than the 
comparator group who had their rent paid direct to their landlord. This compares 
with 5.5 percentage points if early switchbacks were included. 
This suggests a more effective initial support assessment could have a 
statistically significant effect on limiting the impact of direct payment. However 
most of the improvement over time (identified in the previous subsection) can 
be attributed to tenants adapting to the new payment system. 
  
Do tenant's payment follow patterns? 
This is addressed in the following two theme of discussion:  
Themes 1: Is the impact driven by tenants accruing larger arrears and/or 
more tenants accruing arrears? 
Analysis of the proportion of tenants underpaying over time, shows a 
marked spike in the first payment period (Figure 1). Fifty-nine per cent of direct 
payment tenants underpaid or did not pay their rent following their first direct 
payment of Housing Benefit, compared with only 26 per cent of tenants in the 
second payment period before moving onto direct payment. The proportion of 
tenants who underpaid or did not pay quickly returned to baseline levels in 
payment periods two to four. In some payment periods the proportion of tenants 
who underpaid their rent was lower than before the introduction of direct 
payment. However, it is important to note here that although the overall 
proportion of tenants underpaying or not-paying their rent changed little when 
direct payment was introduced (notwithstanding the spike in payment period 1), 
the composition of underpayment did change. In particular, the proportion of 
tenants who failed to pay 50 to 100 per cent of their rent was considerably 
higher under direct payment. This explains how the total value of arrears 
increased even though the overall proportion of tenants underpaying changed 
little after period 1. This is not surprising: pre-direct payment only those eligible 
for a small amount of Housing Benefit could underpay significantly and no 
tenants could fail to pay altogether other than through administrative error.  
 
  
Figure 1: Proportion of tenants underpaying in each payment period, by 
amount 
 
Source: DPDP rent account analysis dataset (2012-2013) 
 
 
Theme 2: Is underpayment consistent or erratic?   
Examining rent payment patterns of 5,031 tenants who received at least 
seven direct payments of Housing Benefit reveals that tenants were more likely 
to underpay erratically than more consistently. To aid the analysis payment 
patterns have been simplified into the following, atheoretical, five group 
classification:  
 full payment: no underpayment made while in receipt of direct payment 
(eight per cent of tenants who received at least seven direct payments) 
 one-off underpayment: only one underpayment made while in receipt of 
direct payment (17 per cent of tenants who received at least seven direct 
payments) 
 frequent, consistent underpayment: at least three underpayments, made 
consecutively, while in receipt of direct payment (27 per cent of tenants 
who received at least seven direct payments) 
 frequent, erratic underpayment: at least three underpayments for tenants 
who received seven to nine direct payments and at least four 
underpayments for those who received ten or more direct payments, with 
no more than two underpayments made consecutively (26 per cent of 
tenants who received at least seven direct payments) 
 infrequent underpayment: two or fewer underpayments for tenants who 
received seven to nine direct payments, and three or fewer underpayments 
for those who received ten or more direct payments, with no more than two 
made consecutively (22 per cent of tenants who received at least seven 
direct payments) 
Of the four underpayment groups, three could be described as 'erratic' 
underpayers: those underpaying once, those underpaying frequently but 
erratically, and those underpaying infrequently. In total 27 per cent of tenants in 
the DPDP who received at least seven direct payments were consistent 
underpayers (29 per cent of all tenants who had an underpayment) and 65 per 
cent were erratic underpayers (71 per cent of tenants who had an 
underpayment) (Figure 2). This suggests while consistent underpayment is 
certainly a feature of tenants' payment patterns, it is not as common as erratic 
underpayment. Consistent underpayment was particularly common early in a 
tenant’s direct payment career, which could suggest teething problems during 
the transition period. For example, approximately one third of all persistent 
underpayers (nine per cent of all tenants) made the first of several consecutive 
underpayments in one of their first three payment period. 
 
  
Figure 2: Proportion of tenants in each payment type 
 
Source: DPDP rent account analysis dataset (2012-2013) 
 
Conclusions 
The introduction of Universal Credit in the UK sees six separate benefits 
combined into one single monthly benefit payment paid direct to the claimant. 
This represents a major change for recipients of Housing Benefit in the social 
rented sector who previously had their benefit paid direct to their landlord. 
Despite differences between welfare states in relation to whether the claimant 
or the landlord receives the Housing Allowance payment, the evidence base on 
the impact of direct payment on rent collection remains underdeveloped. 
In preparation for the introduction of Universal Credit the DWP funded six 
DPDPs to provide learning for the implementation of direct payment of Housing 
Benefit. Using a bespoke dataset created as part of the DWP funded evaluation 
of the Demonstration Projects this paper has explored the effects paying social 
housing tenants their Housing Benefit is likely to have on rent collection and 
arrears. The results have supported the hypothesis that direct payment of 
Housing Benefit to tenants will have a negative effect on both rent collection 















equation 1 - reduced by 5.5 percentage points. Despite this overall negative 
finding more positive evidence emerged by taking a more nuanced assessment 
of the impact. This analysis was informed by NPT, which provides a framework 
to evaluate impact supposing the introduction of direct payment is a process 
that needs to be embedded into day-to-day practice. For instance the longer 
term impact was estimated to be smaller, approximately 2 percentage points. 
This supports both Irvine et al.'s (2007) finding that tenants would be able to 
quickly adapt to the new system and more responsible for paying their rent.  
These findings make an important contribution to the major theoretical 
debate on the effectiveness of using welfare policy to encourage - or 'nudge' - 
responsibilisation, which has become the dominant discourse since the mid-late 
1990's. For most tenants - based on rent recollection and arrears - the 
normalisation process of reconnecting claimants to their rent and giving them 
responsibility for paying their rent was successful. However, despite the majority 
of tenants being able to manage their rent payment, attention should be given 
to the residual negative consequences that direct payment will have on tenants 
and landlords.  In particular this analysis, which has been informed by NPT, 
has identified two main challenges facing landlords, which themselves emerge 
from Wright's two basic models of active welfare recipients. First, how to limit 
the magnitude of the initial impact as tenants transfer onto direct payment. This 
may be achieved by effectively triaging tenants to filter out those - embodied by 
what Wright calls the dominant model - who are too vulnerable, too politically 
sensitive, or who lack the capacity to take ‘responsibility’ for paying their rent. A 
challenge that is likely to repeat in other context where policy has been 
implemented to promote responsibilisation (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Landlords will 
then need to target support on tenants as they transfer onto direct payment by 
enhancing their financial capability and their understanding of what is required 
to be a 'responsible tenant'. This support should include training on setting up 
payment mechanisms, such as direct debits, an approach which is shown to 
promote successful payment (DWP, 2014b).   
Second, even with more effective triage and support, the analysis has 
shown landlords will be exposed to a cocktail of an increased number of tenants 
accruing arrears, an increase in the maximum value of arrears claimants can 
accrue in a given rent period, and unpredictability as to which tenants will 
accrue arrears. This relates to Wright's alternative model of active welfare 
recipients, whereby the prevailing economic and power structures hinder 
tenants' ability to adjust fully to direct payment. The net result will mean 
landlords have to face up to fluidity in their cash flow as tenants move between 
arrears and credit. In addition, there will be increased demand on landlords 
organisational resources generated by arrears and through increased contact 
from tenants. Understanding different strategies that landlords choose to react 
to these challenges deserves further research. It is likely that direct payment of 
Housing Benefit will intensify tensions within landlords about balancing their 
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